Introduction

Why study the emotions through rhetoric? Rhetoric is an engine of social discourse and the art charged with generating and swaying emotion. The history of rhetoric provides a continuous structure by which we can measure how emotions were understood, articulated, and mobilized under various historical circumstances and social contracts. The long tradition of rhetoric is a layered repository of cultural thought about the mimetic and affectively generative powers of language. Rhetorical treatises, whether modern or from the deep past, are aimed at the immediate needs of communication. Their principles are operative across the written records of persuasive contact—from imaginative poetry to the literature of statecraft, from moral and religious writing to legal, ceremonial, and bureaucratic arguments. If the art of rhetoric has always taught how to move minds, its past teachings also reveal how subjective experience was imagined as something to be knowable, harnessed, and expressed. But the challenge is to understand exactly how the rhetoricians imagined the impact of language on audiences, and exactly what roles they conceived emotion to play in persuasion.

This book is about how rhetoric in the West, from late antiquity to the later Middle Ages, represented the role of emotion in shaping persuasions. But the discourses and practices—whether philosophical, spiritual, political, or artistic—that have recorded emotional experience are historically specific. Over the millennium of the Middle Ages the place of emotion within rhetorical theory was to change significantly, according to the variables of textual transmission and conditions of rhetorical teaching. This book traces those changes. It is not a history of feeling per se. My aim is not to understand what people may have felt, but rather how writers and teachers understood the force of emotion when they sought to recruit it in persuasive discourse. In this study I am concerned more with production than with consumption of emotive content: that is, how authors were trained by theory and practical precept to move audiences through texts and speeches. Thus I approach emotion here as the object of rhetorical interest.

As a system of thought and practice, rhetoric has a traceable history that can provide a kind of diachronic “exoskeleton” of subjective experience, a way of formally apprehending emotion in time. Rhetoric is a conceptual system that works in and through history, giving formal expression to social and political thought. Other fields, including notably the histories of philosophy and theology, have mapped out formal narratives for the study of past emotions, and indeed there
has been no lack of such work for the Middle Ages. Research on emotions in ancient and medieval philosophy—from the perspectives of both moral philosophy and cognitive theory—is particularly well advanced. But one of the explicit tasks of rhetoric is to deal with the spectrum of emotions that color judgment, to explain how the passions are best captured and opinions swayed. Thus in its overt and dedicated purpose, rhetoric is closer to the contingencies of experience than virtually any other field. Because of its pragmatic focus on communication, rhetoric obligates itself to different and often deeper levels of belief and practice than philosophy, theology, and other fields can afford. Rhetoric does not give us an unmediated access to the subjective feelings of the past, but its affordance is pragmatism rather than ideal conditions.

But emotion does not figure the same way across all rhetorical doctrine. This issue, the different roles that emotion plays in rhetorical thought, has never been treated comprehensively from antiquity all the way through the Middle Ages. Research on rhetoric in antiquity, the early modern period, and up into contemporary studies, has yielded impressive understandings of the emotions and persuasion. Classical theory stands out for its rich, dedicated explorations of the political and ethical roles of emotion in persuasion: Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Cicero’s *De oratore*, Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*, and from Christian late antiquity, Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*. But even in the fullest historical accounts of


rhetoric and emotion, the Middle Ages occupies a very small space. This is because the period between about 600 and 1450 has not seemed to have much to bring to the theoretical table of rhetoric and the emotions. Yet rhetoric in the Middle Ages, as in other periods, constituted the gateway training for anyone engaged in emotionally persuasive writing. In order to appreciate what the Middle Ages contributes fundamentally to a rhetorical dynamic that is part of our own modern understanding, it is necessary to sift slowly and carefully down through the sedimented layers of the centuries. This book seeks to color in what has largely been a blank space between late antiquity and the cusp of early modernity.

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Because this book is about medieval rhetoric and the emotions, not about rhetoric and the emotions at large, its parameters must be what the Middle Ages had available by way of rhetoric, both what it inherited from antiquity and what it produced for itself. Since the history recounted here is a long one, it will help at the start to sketch in the sources that came down to the Western Middle Ages and the order in which they found their ways into medieval dossiers. In this book I observe the chronology of a reception history. Readers familiar with the outline of the history of rhetoric as a whole may be surprised not to find extensive accounts of some of the major treatises of antiquity and their aesthetics and ethical principles. But my concern here is not with the emotional theory of classical rhetoric in general; rather, I focus on the theory that the Middle Ages derived from its limited legacy of classical rhetoric. Most medieval writers did not have De oratore or Quintilian’s Institutio, and it was not until quite late that they had access to Aristotle. They certainly did not have Hellenistic Greek rhetoricians and theorists of style except as these were filtered through some Latin sources. But what moderns might view as a narrow canon was to prove remarkably fruitful for medieval rhetoricians. As we will see, they continually reinvented the rhetorical understanding of emotion for their own purposes, and their teaching was especially responsive when texts previously unknown came on the scene. This book is about the continual transformations of a legacy, the making of new rhetorical perspectives on emotions and the practices that embodied them.

It is well known that the medieval West built its tradition of rhetorical teaching on an essentially Roman textual canon, and moreover on only a small number of those texts that we would now consider central to Roman rhetorical thought. Because of, or perhaps simply in conjunction with, the preferences of late antique commentators for the more technical accounts of the art, the authoritative text dominating curricula for many centuries was Cicero’s De inventione (c.89 BCE). It is a truncated text, covering only the first canon of rhetoric, invention, in exhaustive technical detail. Yet it was the mainstay of rhetorical education during the early Middle Ages, the Carolingian period, and right through the late Middle Ages. It survives in slightly over 400 manuscripts (including extracts and
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incomplete texts, and glossed and unglossed copies), many of these produced over the course of the twelfth century, and thus rivaling Virgil’s *Aeneid* as one of the most copied classical texts. Its influence stands behind the medieval remaking of classical rhetoric over the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, although superficially the medieval treatises (the arts of poetry and letter-writing) seem to have little in common with the Ciceronian text. Cicero’s mature and expansive *De oratore*, appreciated in modern times for its powerful meditation on the orator’s own capacity for feeling the emotion that he will generate, had so little circulation in the Middle Ages as to be without significant influence. Cicero’s *Orator*, another work of his mature years, had an indirect reception in the Middle Ages through book 4 of Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*, which quotes its doctrine on the levels of style, and later through Hrabanus Maurus’ *De institutione clericorum*, which quotes at length from Augustine’s *De doctrina*.

Another work contemporary with the *De inventione* was the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (*c*. 86–82 BCE), a complete and admirably balanced art of rhetoric which was attributed to Cicero until the fifteenth century. This gained influence only around 1050. It was known to some degree in late antiquity: Martianus Capella seems to rely on the *Ad Herennium* for some of his account of invention (in the rhetoric book of his *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*), and its comprehensive treatment of style seems to have remained available to authors up through at least the fourth century CE. But it soon fell out of use. Why the *Ad Herennium* ceased being copied regularly, and all but disappeared from teaching until the second half of the eleventh century, remains a mystery. This is especially curious because once it regained traction over the course of the twelfth century, it outstripped *De inventione* as the preferred classical resource for teaching and commentary, its circulation steadily increasing with an explosion of copying during the fourteenth century. One possible explanation for this late burst of popularity was its appeal to preachers, being at once comprehensive and relatively compact. The *Ad Herennium* survives (complete or incomplete, glossed and unglossed) in over 700 manuscripts, mostly from the twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. Its account of style became extremely influential for studies

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6 Ward, *Classical Rhetoric*, p. 46.
of figures and tropes after the eleventh century. Its treatment of subjects such as pathetic appeals in the peroration overlap with that found in the *De inventione*.

So embedded were *De inventione* and, belatedly, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that even after the humanist recovery of complete copies of the mature Ciceronian texts and Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*, renaissance rhetorical teaching continued to find its bearings in the older foundational works.

Horace’s *Ars poetica* (c. 19 BCE), a work that is not really a rhetorical art but has substantial overlaps with rhetoric, was also a mainstay of the medieval curriculum, copied, routinely glossed, and used continuously through the early and later Middle Ages and beyond. It is extraordinary that a work as elusive in its meaning and diffuse in its advice, a sophisticated poem about poetic decorum aimed at fellow Latin poets, could be a fixture of medieval classrooms, used as a pragmatic guide to composition and style. Whatever its pedagogical deficiencies (which medieval teachers came to recognize and compensate for in their glosses and extended commentaries), it served as an entry to mastering literary Latinity. Only in the later twelfth century did it begin to be replaced by poetic treatises that were more suitable for medieval students. 7 Although it has passing advice about the dramatic poet who must feel the sorrow to be conveyed by the character, its greater contribution to medieval teaching on pathetic appeal is its complementarity with stylistic instruction.

The other great rhetorical art of Roman antiquity, Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* (finished c. 95 CE), had a fitful reception in the Middle Ages. The *Institutio* was known mainly in incomplete copies and extracts, and indirectly through some later summaries of rhetoric, including those by Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville. It also featured among the sources used in some of the late antique compendia of rhetoric. 8 It is an overstatement to say that Quintilian was unknown to the Middle Ages, for at least half of the *Institutio* could be read, and in the fourteenth century early Italian humanists showed great interest in the material they had available. But we can point to just four complete texts (made in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries). It was only Poggio Bracciolini’s transcription of one of these found at St. Gall that initiated the wide reception of the *Institutio*. Most important for us here is what was missing from the better known partial copies of Quintilian’s rhetoric: book 6 and much of books 8 and 9 were gone (along with books 7 and 10). Quintilian’s fine expression of emotional sharing between speaker and audience in book 6 would not be among the influences carried over from antiquity; and the

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lacuna extended to his explanations of the figures of heightened emotion in books 8 and 9.9

Thus for nearly one thousand years, the standard medieval canon of ancient rhetoric consisted of *De inventione*, *Ars poetica*, and only toward the end of that millenium the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*; these were supplemented by late antique manuals and expositions of ancient doctrine, including such famous works as Martianus Capella’s *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, Cassiodorus’ *Institutiones*, and, a little later, Isidore of Seville’s *Etymologiae*. But to note the absence of certain classical texts in the medieval dossier is not to apologize for the Middle Ages. Rather, knowing what they did not have makes us appreciate more profoundly what rhetoricians and writers accomplished, and should render us more sensitive to the nuances of medieval rhetorical thought as it took on new forms through the centuries. Medieval rhetoric, in its turn, was no mere repetition of faded classical teaching. In the early centuries and especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, rhetorical theory bounded forward to find new ways to express the pleasure of moving an audience or being moved, to articulate the power of style or the power of emotional reasoning.

Over the course of the thirteenth century, another, much earlier text expanded medieval horizons of ancient rhetoric. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was translated into Latin at several points during the century, first from Greek, then from Arabic, and then again, and authoritatively, from Greek in about 1269. The last translation, by William of Moerbeke, put the *Rhetoric* into circulation with the corpus of the *Aristoteles latinus*, the works of Aristotle now available to readers in the Latin West. But in manuscripts, Aristotle’s rhetoric was usually accompanied by other works of Aristotle (most often the *Ethics* and the *Politics*), not with other works from the Latin rhetorical canon. Although its circulation was vast and its influence far-reaching, its reception was not as a “rhetoric” in the prescriptive tradition of the Roman treatises. Yet despite its positioning as a work associated with Aristotle’s moral philosophy, or perhaps because of this, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* changed the debates at the highest levels about the definition, purpose, and function of rhetoric. Its appearance on the Western scene marks a new beginning in the history of rhetoric. While never finding a place in the practical teaching of rhetoric, it helped to reshape conceptions of civic discourse and social interaction in the 150 years after its reappearance in the West. Its impact was most powerful

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through an even more influential intermediary: the *De regimine principum* of Giles of Rome, which successfully married the method of Aristotelian moral philosophy to the mirror of princes genre. Giles’ *De regimine* circulated widely, not only in Latin but in many vernacular translations.

The tradition of Western rhetoric evolved in parallel with philosophical and theological traditions. At times these tracks also intersected. In the following chapters I offer contextual discussions of philosophical and spiritual systems of emotion as they relate to developments in rhetoric. But rhetorical uses of emotion are often quite different from what we find in philosophy, devotion, theology, and pastoralia. Indeed, the rhetorical history of emotions cannot necessarily (or even for the most part) be explained by reference to dominant discourses of philosophy and theology. As we will see, philosophical treatments of emotion, from antiquity onwards, may be normative, that is, urging a certain emotional disposition in view of mental clarity or physical health, or taxonomical, generating categories and sub-categories of emotions in order to arrive at a full psychological picture of mind or soul. The normative position can serve an ethical purpose, to achieve happiness, most famously instantiated in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which recognizes the natural and cognitive aspects of emotions as part of a good life if they are trained towards the right ends of sound judgment and virtuous habit. But the normative position can also regard powerful emotions as harmful false judgments and irrational motions that should be eradicated in order to achieve *apatheia*, existence in a state of virtuous tranquility that can include sober emotional responses guided by reason. This is the outlook of the ancient Stoics (late fourth century BCE through mid-third century CE). We will see that Cicero’s *De inventione* uses this model as a point of departure in *De inventione*, where emotion—*commutatio*—is a topic of invention, an attribute of the person whose actions are being considered. Of course, Cicero’s use of it in a rhetorical context must take the problem in a different direction from philosophical argument: its value in the Ciceronian context is not normative but descriptive. On slightly different terms it is also the outlook of Neoplatonism (third through sixth centuries CE), where leaving the emotions behind is part of the process of freeing the soul from contingent attachments so that it can ascend towards a divine perfection. The Stoic but especially the Neoplatonist perspective offers eradication of passions as a therapy.

From antiquity we also see the beginnings of taxonomies of emotion. The Stoics divided emotion into good and bad feelings: pleasure and desire on the one hand, distress and fear on the other. They further divided each emotion into an involuntary occurrence and a voluntary indulgence of a feeling. This system found its way very early into Christian philosophy and into a psychology of sin in Augustine, Nemesius, and John Damascene. But the most finely calibrated taxonomies of the psyche and its emotional temperaments would come later, with Avicenna’s *De anima* (translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century).
Avicenna looked back to Aristotle’s own *De anima* and its account of the role of emotions in the senses and the soul, but he elaborates a most complex division of the soul, subdividing the emotions into different powers. Across the thirteenth century in the Latin West, the influence of the Avicennan taxonomy was pervasive: theologians such as Aquinas built upon it to create detailed pictures of the soul and the will. But however subtle, ultimately these are maps, classifications.

As influential as Stoic and Neoplatonist ideas were for Christian philosophy, and as important as psychological taxonomies were to become for theological reflection on the will, rhetorical thought and practice were never entirely answerable to these perspectives, simply because rhetorical persuasion is an engine of emotional arousal. This does not mean that rhetorical practice operated in some kind of intentional defiance of philosophical and theological dicta, but rather that it had different purposes. Certainly some purposes, such as stimulating love of God or penitential sorrow, were complementary with the aims of theological teaching. But most rhetorical practice operated on an axis quite different from those of philosophy and theology, treating communication horizontally, in social terms, rather than on the vertical axes of an individual apprehending a godhead or a philosophical truth.

The legacy of Ciceronian rhetoric (along with its late antique supplements) developed on its own course for well over a thousand years, giving rise to virtual industries of compositional and stylistic treatises, all of which promoted eliciting emotion as a sign of persuasive success. Where they register a theory of emotion, it is not in terms of an ideal of *apatheia* or even of moderation, except in the sense that they attribute to rhetoric the singular power of both arousing heightened feeling and calming it. In the thirteenth century, the appearance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the Latin West provided yet another way of articulating the function of emotion as a dynamic part of persuasive discourse. Unlike both the therapeutic and taxonomic models, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* book 2 treats the emotions non-normatively, as behavioral phenomena that are the foundation of social and political understanding. The *Rhetoric* showed the political dimension of emotions as part of public life and as an expression of the speaker’s political understanding. It was not inevitable that the Aristotelian rhetorical perspective would be absorbed and even compete with philosophical taxonomies and normative therapies of emotion. But its perspectives were absorbed by poets and clerics, mainly through the influence of the political writing that took it on so comprehensively.

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In order to understand what any period of rhetoric’s history has to offer to a theory of emotion and persuasion, we must discover what that rhetorical theory had to say about producing emotion. In antiquity there was an extensive and profound understanding of rhetoric as an engine of emotional response. To what extent did
Emotion is not the only mode of persuasion in rhetoric, and often it is subordinate to rational argumentation, whether about law, the circumstances of the case, or the welfare of the state. A great deal of rhetorical theory concerns itself with rational argumentation. Thus, to understand how emotion can be important in the art of persuasion, we must begin by asking exactly where emotion resides in teaching of the art. Is it the subject of considered reflection about how to achieve an argument or about the affective quality of language? And what if, as is the case across much of the early and later Middle Ages, rhetorical doctrine appears to have little or nothing to say about the purpose of generating emotion? While no modern reader would doubt the genuinely affective content of medieval writing in any genre or language, how do we get access to the theory that would attend rhetorical practice if the treatises are silent on their assumptions about passionate discourse? Of course, we can work backward from many examples of practice to infer some general ideas. But that does not lead us to a systematic framework. It is precisely the absence of systematic accounts of emotion among medieval rhetorical treatises that has led modern scholars to assume that there was little or no theory, and thus that the period stretching from Augustine to Bruni and Valla has little to contribute to a history of emotion and rhetoric.

A principal reason why medieval rhetorical thought about emotion has not been recognized as thought per se is that it does not always present itself in the expected places or in obvious ways in the treatises. And so what critics of earlier generations saw as asymmetry between rhetorical treatises and rhetorically self-conscious art has persisted as a notion: that somehow the best medieval writing exceeds what are seen as the merely technical interests of medieval precept. But as we will see, emotion occupies different positions in systems of rhetoric. This is one of the most important issues that I consider here. If rhetorical teaching and theory change over time—and indeed can alter radically over relatively short periods—the understanding of how emotion fits into the system of persuasion also changes. Here I anticipate some of the main theoretical concerns and historical arguments of this book in order to provide in advance a thematic structure of the whole.

The classical theory that the Middle Ages inherited considered the production of an oration or text in terms of several competences, most importantly the discovery of the core argument through methods of proof (invention), the ordering of the parts of the argument for greatest impact (arrangement), and the stylistic choices that give the work its outer appearance (style or elocutio). The system has a centrifugal momentum driving from inner idea about what will be proven through reasoning, to organization of those proofs, and to outward expression that delivers the proof to an audience. These proficiencies are always claimed to
be interdependent, yet even within classical theory the emphasis can shift from focus on proof to focus on the outer surface of stylistic embellishment. Emotion, in turn, is at times treated as part of the process of finding proof, at times as an aspect of the speaker’s own shared values with the audience, and at times as a property of style.

Emotion may be treated as one of the functions of finding proof, as in Cicero’s *De inventione*, where the conditions of emotion are treated as part of a system of reasoning: invention, or finding strategies of argument. Here, the emotion is not in the audience or even in the speaker, but is a topic of investigation for explaining the character of the defendant, to show that a person may be “affected” by an upheaval or alteration of the mind such as joy, desire, fear, and distress (*De inventione* 1.25.36). I discuss this passage of *De inventione* at length in Chapter 1. For now, it is important to point out that this particular and crucial positioning of emotion draws upon a common understanding of emotions without involving the affective responses of speaker or audience. Here, emotion is something to think with, a tool for determining what elements of character are relevant to an action that the defendant performed. It helps to shape the orator’s argument about that action. Knowing the defendant’s emotional state at the time of committing the crime may or may not elicit a reaction from the audience or judges. But the role played by this element, this “attribute of the person,” is as a topic of invention, to allow the speaker to generate arguments from certain known qualities (of character) and facts (of actions). In this, emotion is also anchored to what was seen as the innermost core of the rhetorical system, the thought process of invention, where the arguments that prove the case are devised. On the terms of classical rhetoric, invention is the first procedure, the stabilized, ideational point of departure. Here, where emotion is connected with method, it is not hostage to changing circumstances, even if the actual experience of emotion is seen as a fleeting condition, an upheaval.

From another theoretical perspective, emotion as a form of proof may reside in the audience itself, as an ongoing condition of social life. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* presents *pathos* or the passions as a form and site of proof, along with *logos*, the form of arguments in the speech itself, and *ēthos*, or the character that the speaker projects in the oration. On Aristotle’s terms, the social nature of human passions is a given that the orator must know and understand, and *pathos* as a form of proof is a system of drawing on that knowledge to recruit emotions for persuasion. Thus, if anger is triggered by feeling slighted (according to Aristotle’s account of anger), the orator might arouse public outrage by describing the insolent behavior of enemies. On this model, emotions are an abiding phenomenon of political existence. Indeed, twentieth-century phenomenology was to recognize in Aristotle’s analytic a powerful engagement with emotions as drivers of communication. Emotions are contingencies, but for this very reason they are primary forces through which
speech apprehends immediate circumstances. As Aristotle presents it in the *Rhetoric*, emotions are the basis of communal life: in this context they are produced by social encounters and in turn they bring about social interaction. Thus, they are a psychological resource to be tapped by an orator, not generated from nothing. Here, emotions are in one way raw material, but in another way the very matter of proof through the rhetorical device of the enthymeme. In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, enthymemes are the core of rhetorical reasoning: they serve the same function in rhetoric that the syllogism serves in logic. But the enthymeme is more flexible than the syllogism. Where the premises in a syllogism must meet a high standard of logical validity, the enthymeme is receptive to probabilities and to the beliefs and values of a particular audience, the kinds of people to be persuaded. Where the logical syllogism relies on a chain of reasoning to validate every premise, the enthymeme can simplify that system by assuming agreement on some premises. The enthymeme calls upon the heart, on judgments founded as much on intuitions and emotions as on logical reasoning. It constructs proofs by appealing to beliefs that are conditioned by emotions. In this way public emotions constitute a core mechanism of proof, central rather than eccentric to the aims of rhetorical reasoning.

These two models, both making emotion internal to the mechanics of proof, passed to the Middle Ages under different conditions of reception. But emotion may also occupy a powerful position outside of the core methods of proof, when it is a value shared between speaker and audience. Both Cicero (in his mature *De oratore*) and Quintilian develop the idea that the emotion generated in the audience must have an ethical correlative in the orator’s own affective response. If the orator wants to arouse passion in an audience, he himself must feel that passion and be able to convey it through his own style (*De oratore* 2.45.189–90; *Institutio oratoria* 6.2). This is of such importance to Quintilian that he offers advice about how the orator can bring himself to feel the intense emotion that he wants to generate in his audience: through the device of *phantasia*, vivid mental imagery through which he will see what he wants his audience to see. Planting emotion in the speaker ensures an investment in, a responsibility for, the emotions generated: it is a way of protecting rhetoric from charges of mere beguiling, of fraudulent manipulation of gullible crowds.

But these ideas from Cicero’s *De oratore* and Quintilian did not pass directly to the Middle Ages, where neither of these works were much known. What did pass to the Middle Ages was yet another model in which emotion was bound almost completely to stylistic surface. Style has had a paradoxical value in rhetoric

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10 See Chapter 4, pp. 160, 166–7.

from classical antiquity onwards. On the one hand, it is represented as external embellishment, the surface that is applied to render the inner core of argument beautiful and emotionally affecting. On the other hand, style can be considered so important to persuasive effect that it should have some constitutive power of meaning. Whatever claims were made for its centrality, however, style was readily separable from the rest of rhetoric and was often the object of the greatest suspicion about the artfulness of eloquence. The Platonic critique of rhetoric, that it appeals to gratification and pleasure (for example, Gorgias 462c), has been echoed in various ways from antiquity to modernity, from Cicero’s worry that wisdom must accompany eloquence to Adorno’s condemnation of the false notes of style. But the actual history of rhetoric, in its passage from late antiquity into the Middle Ages, tells a different and much less defensive story. In the schools of late antiquity, where ceremonial or epideictic rhetoric superseded legal and political oratory and where laudatory speech-making was an aesthetic pursuit, style came to be a subject often taught by itself, a kind of contraction of rhetoric into one of its parts. Under these conditions it was also to style that the bulk of teaching about emotion was consigned. But this teaching did not consist of explicit theorizing about persuasion through the passions. Rather, it taught style, especially the figures and the tropes, as something that could be charged with emotional impact. Examples of figures and tropes conveying heightened emotion were taken from canonical poetry and prose that students would already have encountered in their literary training.

As a property of stylistic effect detached from a teaching of reasoning or from an explicit social understanding of emotion as a form of proof, what can emotion be bound to in ethical terms? In premodern rhetorics, style was often understood as a surface artifice that was not necessarily answerable to the truths of reasoning or ethics. Such bias against stylistic surface has persisted in Western critical thought, and has motivated many critiques of rhetoric as “mere” figuration. In the twenty-first century, critical discussions about “surface reading” have sought to rescue practical engagement with the literary or descriptive surface, to consider what it might mean to describe and explain rather than to theorize away from or beneath the text, or to understand the value for reading of rich sensory engagement. Prioritizing the encounter with the surface is to find meaning and value in its affective strategies and formal coherence and to resist the force of the surface-depth paradigm that has driven hermeneutics—scriptural interpretation,
theories of the symbol—from antiquity onwards. On these terms, surface reading is already interpretation: the surface is no mere set of symptoms to yield to the pressure of a deep reading that will uncover the repressed and vexatious contradictions lurking beneath a beautifully designed exterior. The affective pleasure of form can entail cognitive as well as ethical lessons.\textsuperscript{14} Recent work on medieval aesthetics, in the visual as well as the verbal arts, has also championed a predilection for the experience of richly detailed surfaces, a conception of beauty tied to sensation and apprehension of forms rather than to theological or cosmic truths.\textsuperscript{15}

The idea of the sensual attractiveness of virtuosic style may well have been a strong imperative for the rhetorical teachers of late antiquity who compiled iterative taxonomies of figures and tropes. As I will argue here, one assumption that seems to drive these late antique style manuals, with their targeted examples of figures used in emotive contexts, is that the speaker (or writer) can elicit emotion at will because audiences respond to the sensory appeal of language. By drawing on canonical examples they were also showing their students how and why their beloved texts moved them so much. But because it was so often seen as mere surface, style could be dismissed as ancillary, mere dressing or pompous finery unfixed to any ethical purpose. From a moral perspective, it would be unsafe to consign emotion to the contingent realm of style. But early Christian rhetoricians, themselves educated in the epideictic rhetoric of the late antique schools, were to confront this by returning to the idea of emotion as a shared value between speaker and audience, or between teacher, text, and student: for Augustine and Cassiodorus especially, the beautifully affective surface of the scriptural text elicits an emotional response in all readers, both the teacher who explains the power of the text and the students who gain new understanding.

From the sixth century to the fifteenth, medieval rhetorical thought was to experiment with all of these models of emotional persuasion. Where the teaching of rhetoric focused on style, emotion was also a property of style, with all of the ethical and intellectual questions that attend this position. Where rhetorical thought placed its focus on proof, emotion took on a different role in persuasion, not necessarily more important in terms of effect, but more explicitly connected with the function of reasoning.

If this book has a plot, it is a double one. It begins before the Middle Ages, with the treatment of emotion in the Ciceronian rhetorics and especially in the handbooks of late antiquity, texts that formed the basis of rhetorical theory in the


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In this, the first tradition to bed itself down, the active teaching of rhetoric as an art tended to give preeminence to style, and the work of eliciting emotion was treated as a stylistic issue. I trace this diachronic history through the later part of the fourteenth century. But the later Middle Ages was also an era that saw the arrival of a radical alternative to earlier rhetorical systems. The “doubling” (or braiding) of this book’s narratives involves the reappearance of Aristotle’s Rhetoric through the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke, and the definitive commentary by Giles of Rome. In order to tell this double plot we have to go to antiquity a second time, to tell the separate story of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its fortunes, tracing it through its reception in the medieval West. The Rhetoric arrived onto a scene already long committed to the Latin rhetorics of antiquity, especially their teaching of invention and style. It took a generation or two for Aristotle’s Rhetoric to gain its medieval audience, and it never supplanted the tradition that was already in place. But it could run in parallel or even co-exist with the earlier tradition, even to the extent of forming a kind of hybrid outlook in the oeuvre of one writer. The Rhetoric offered the Western Middle Ages what was, for them, an entirely new way of articulating the place and function of emotion in persuasive discourse, as a fund of psychological and political knowledge on the part of the speaker. Over the thousand years of what we call the Middle Ages, rhetoric was not one homogenous block but a dynamic system of different strands. Thus, also the place and value of emotion in the system changed with the different valences of the system.

The foregoing offers a thematic perspective on this book and a broad view of the history of rhetoric that it narrates. These clarifications should indicate how I approach the question of emotion through the historical framework of rhetoric. This book came into being through studies of rhetoric, beginning with my desire to learn more about the impact of Aristotle’s Rhetoric on medieval teaching. It became clear to me that one of its acute contributions to late medieval thought was its phenomenology of emotions. While the story of the Rhetoric’s entrance into the medieval West has been told many times (as the notes in this book will indicate), it has not been told with respect to the reception of Aristotle’s idea that emotion itself can form a basis of proof. The Rhetoric opened a perspective on emotion as a social phenomenon that was new to medieval readers accustomed to Stoic and Neoplatonist positions on managing the private passions. But understanding the impact of the new requires a picture of how earlier medieval rhetorical traditions and related discourses had treated the emotions. Thus, what I have described as the “double plot” of this book: writing the emotions in medieval rhetoric as a reception history that commences with the Ciceronian rhetorics of antiquity, that develops on a long course, and that, at a later juncture, incorporates the Aristotelian perspective. In this book, Aristotle is not the beginning of a
historical tradition of rhetoric, but a new beginning, after the twelve-hundred or so years during which Ciceronian rhetoric had embedded itself in Western thought.

This rhetorical perspective also frames the approach to history of the emotions here. At this point, it will be useful to look at the main currents of that lively field, pointing to convergences with and differences from the present work. The word “emotion” itself has become contested in light of significant work on its modern origins. “Emotion” as a term and category came into common use in English over the nineteenth century in the context of scientific psychology, where it superseded a range of English words, notably “passion,” “affection,” and “sentiment.” These earlier terms in English evoked a more differentiated typology of feeling and cognition than what is now seen as the overly-homogenous category “emotions,” especially when viewed as non-reasoning impulses. Recognizing the relative modernity of emotion as a scientific category is important for the future of psychological and sociological analysis (especially in English-language contexts).

But for a deep historical excavation of rhetorical thought in Greek, Latin, and early European vernaculars, where we will continually confront the premodern terms—pathos, passio, motus, commotio, commutatio, perturbatio, affectus, affectio—as well as the variable names of individual feelings—in all of their complexity and ideational specificity, the distinction in English between, say, “emotion” and “passion” seems to me less critical. The nuances of the ancient and medieval terms cannot be precisely rendered in their English cognates because of the coloring that modern words have acquired or the narrowing of their associations: for example, the wide semantic range of passio in medieval Latin (emotion, suffering, Christ’s Passion) can hardly be rendered by “passion” in ordinary modern English usage; similarly, pietas (and its vernacular cognates) can only be rendered incompletely in English as “compassion,” “pity,” or “piety.” Nevertheless, the English word “emotion” does have the advantage of ordinary usage, not as a scientific category but as a general term to denote a recognizable range of mental, physical, and even moral and social responses. I also take the broadest view of the words “affective” and “affect,” since the meaning of the Latin words affectio/affectus (a mental or physical state of arousal, a mood or feeling, an emotional disposition) is embedded in the modern words.


Several influential categories have emerged in studies of the history of emotions that have some intersectional value with the history of rhetoric that I present here, to the extent that there is a shared interest in patterns of language use that give expression to feelings. My focus is on systematic and preceptive accounts of persuasion: how rhetoric supplies explanations for the impact of emotional appeals, leading to understanding of how speakers and writers conceived the challenges of communication. Of paramount importance is what medieval literary cultures did with the paradigms of rhetorical teaching about emotion that they inherited and refashioned. A discourse that theorizes and encourages emotional persuasion is also setting certain normative standards of expression for what is felt, and thus has something in common with the social history framework of “emotional styles.” A repeated teaching practice that promotes certain channels of expression for feelings to be elicited in an audience may also constitute a certain kind of “emotional community.” On these terms, the passage of a set of directives from classroom to classroom over the generations might be seen to produce shared norms about how key emotions find literary expression. In these ways, the history of rhetoric joins the aggregate of fields of emotion history that remain to be mapped out. If rhetoric has an external history of its own developments, that history can also provide a perspective on emotional activity. Similarly, the developments of monasticism and medieval piety, both diachronically traceable subjects unto themselves, can be enlisted in the service of a historical picture of emotional cultures. What will make the study of rhetoric different as a method from the study of “emotional styles” and histories of spirituality is that rhetorical theory and teaching are intentionally and continually directed at communication and emotional persuasion. Historical data from fields such as politics and piety may yield up felicitous information about emotions often enough to produce verifiable patterns for historical analysis (for example, the emotional portraits of Saint Louis). But emotion per se is a dedicated subject of rhetoric, and rhetoric will supply the historical framework through which we understand how persuasive practices changed over time. Through rhetoric we are


19 Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), and Generations of Feeling.


not directly concerned with how people managed feelings, but rather with how writers and speakers configured their preceptive sources to accommodate the aim of appealing to emotion.

This does not mean that rhetorical teaching is always explicit about its aims with regard to emotion: often we must draw out the implications of emotional interest by reading contextually, uncovering the assumptions that governed standards of teaching or practice. Here, we can also find common methodological ground with the study of emotional styles and related fields, because we are confronted with a text that reveals its governing protocols only by comparison with earlier precepts for expressing powerful feeling; similarly, the notion of emotional styles looks for changes in forms of expression that may in turn signify different ways of apprehending or even informing emotional experience.

Important work on literary discourse and history has focused on the “emotional script” immanent in representation, the conventions that signpost codes of behavior within the literary tradition: genre, style, voice all contribute to generating an emotionally legible script that pertains to the experience of literature. Audiences have, as it were, a road map of emotional codes, learned through familiarity with the variables of a literary tradition as well as the moral fixtures and performative elements of a culture.22 Active emotional responses such as compassion can also be “learned” from textual resources such as meditations on the Passion, which invite the audience to perform and thus also interiorize a certain emotional protocol.23 Such models of emotional training invite comparison with the rhetorical and literary pedagogies of reading the classical authors that Marjorie Curry Woods has illuminated: such emotional pedagogies call upon the affective hardwiring of students, reminding them how a poetic passage has moved them in the past, marking and naming the devices that have this effect, or parsing the literary text for the cues that should prompt them to respond affectively. These affective pedagogies also intersect with rhetorical mnemonics in what Jody Enders has called the “virtual performativity of memory,” where witnessing suffering in the theater cues an emotion memory in the audience.24

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22 For example, Sif Rikhardsdottir, Emotion in Old Norse Literature: Translations, Voices, Contexts (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2017); see also the essays in Mary Flannery, ed., Emotion and Medieval Textual Media (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018).
I have used the terms “theory” and “practice” to indicate the frameworks through which we encounter rhetorical assumptions. We may think now of “theory” as some kind of metacritical reflection on texts, systems, and discourses, different from the way these objects of analysis are experienced from within. But what does it mean to speak of rhetorical theory and practice as if they constitute two separate realms? On the one hand, we will find distanced critical speculation in rhetorical treatises, especially in their prologues, where they reflect on the principles of the art, its purpose, its ethical and intellectual values. On the other hand, rhetorical theory is only ever a belated formation looking back on practices of persuasion. Even a theory that claims to be from first principles is responding, at least descriptively, to existing practices. Thus, Aristotle begins his *Rhetoric* with the claim that there has been no scientific account of the art of rhetoric as a whole, only random formularies. But those formularies, compilations of examples, form part of a network of practice. Preceptive arts, by nature aimed at future texts, operate under a kind of fiction that they are the theoretical seedbeds for generating the texts-to-come, as if prescriptive theory must precede practice. Yet rhetorical theory, whatever its domain (legal or political rhetoric, literary composition, preaching) is dependent on the witness of practice. And in this respect also, “theory” is never far from the experience of persuading or being persuaded, or of teaching or being taught.

This question about theory and practice invites another and more searching one: where does the art of rhetoric itself—and thus its field of emotional play—lie? Does it lie in the prescriptions laid out in the numerous arts and manuals, which will constitute a large focus of this study? Does it lie in the practical examples that those arts provide by way of illustration? Does it lie in the lessons that students took away from the teaching and that are registered in countless examples of proficient writing? Does it lie in the effect on audiences (difficult to gauge unless written records tell us how a discourse was received or manuscript circulation attests to wide interest)? Does it lie in the metalanguage that treatises, and the commentaries on them, sought to articulate when trying to define what rhetoric is (what are the origins of rhetoric, what is its relationship to other arts, what are its limits)? Or does it lie precisely in what rhetorical competence would have us *not* see, the use of a technical armory to produce powerful effects without us noticing the machinery that brings them about? Any attempt to navigate the interplay between theory and practice brings us face to face with this array of problems.

Such provocative questions will drive this study of emotion and the history of rhetoric from later antiquity through the Middle Ages. Theory will not always correspond to practice, in part because rhetorical practices respond to changing historical circumstances on a different schedule, as it were, from more speculative theoretical interests. It could be said that rhetorical *theory* about emotion stays
almost static for a millennium; but at the same time, pragmatic precepts and practices were to change under pressure from new social conditions. As we shall see, in order to generalize about practice we must often infer determinative principles—whether a “theory” of form, cognition, or ethics that pertains to emotion—from related works, either the preceptive manuals or the kinds of texts to which they point. Chapter 1 traces the millennial length of a particular theoretical discourse about affectio that begins with Cicero’s De inventione before turning to a tradition of stylistic teaching that arose in parallel with that speculative rhetorical thought and that was to have much more profound consequences for medieval rhetorical practice. Chapter 2 considers the fortunes of that stylistic teaching in late antique and early Christian literary rhetoric: Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, Macrobius’ Saturnalia, and Cassiodorus’ psalm commentary. Here, the teaching can explicitly articulate an ethical dimension of style; but when that outlook is merely assumed (rather than overtly stated), as in monastic and clerical rhetorics over the following centuries, the force of that ethical defense of rhetoric diminishes. But alongside the abridging of the ethical defense, style itself becomes an explosive field in the professional rhetorics of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the ars dictaminis and the ars poetriae, as we see in Chapter 3. These new pragmatics of rhetorical theory trace their roots back to the epideictic teaching of late antiquity, where the whole range of emotions is a property of style. The arts of poetry and of letter-writing have proved extremely resistant to modern theoretical probing of their affective and aesthetic principles, because they stress the technical dimension of composition. But they also see rhetoric as a performance-oriented enterprise, and for them the obvious resource for generating strong emotion lies in style. This apotheosis of style is the most durable medieval tradition of teaching how to respond affectively to texts and to write affectively oneself. It manifests itself with joyful zeal in all quarters, from lowly classroom poetry and exemplary anthologies to Petrarch’s commanding high style.

From following this long and varied tradition of stylistic teaching and practice we turn once again, in Chapter 4, to dedicated theory: now the reception of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and especially its analytic of the emotions from antiquity to the late thirteenth century. Most important in this reception, as Chapter 5 shows, is the translation of the Rhetoric from the speculative domain of scholastic philosophy to political philosophy and statecraft in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum. Giles was the most influential expositor of the Rhetoric. In his early commentary on it he showed little understanding of Aristotle’s distinctive phenomenology of emotions, but in his mirror of princes written only a few years later he not only registered but mobilized that active political dimension of emotion that is so important to Aristotelian rhetoric. The impact of the Rhetoric, directly through the text itself but more commonly through Giles’ influential political treatise, is witnessed in political poetry (exemplified in
Here we encounter another aspect of the tension between theory and practice: does theory change practice? Did Aristotelian rhetorical theory on emotions make writers do anything that they had not done before? While there is much evidence for absorption, both directly and indirectly, of Aristotelian rhetoric, the crucial point here is not that the new rhetoric changed people's habits. Rather, it sharpened their perception of what persuasive writing had always done, and focused their understanding of emotion as a resource of political argument. It gave them a new language in which to register their persuasive activity as writers and speakers, and it named and explained the time-honored device of the enthymeme, which validates emotions and beliefs as grounds of proof. If Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provided a doctrinal “theory,” it was by bringing emotions to the surface as a theorizable object, and showing why emotion is a core element of rhetorical proof, not a peripheral stylistic add-on. In the most productive sense that theory is belated: writers recognized their own practices in the theory that they met in the *Rhetoric*.

But as important for rhetorical thought as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* came to be, it did not completely overturn or displace everything that had gone before. Rather, it provided an alternative way of knowing emotion. As I suggest in the Epilogue, its presence is felt where it often works alongside the long-established models of Ciceronianism and stylistic teaching to produce a “hybrid” rhetoric of the emotions. But that “Aristotelian turn” of later medieval rhetoric looks forward to the rhetorics of the Renaissance and their long process of coming to terms with the emotional teaching of Aristotle and of the other classical sources joining the expanding dossier of rhetoric.

In this book, I study rhetoric—through its theoretical arms and its many precepts and applications—as the vehicle of thought about the relationship of emotion and language, emotion and reasoning. To write a history of how rhetoric processes emotion is thus also to write a new kind of history of rhetoric. Rhetoric is its own “practice” of emotion as both embedded in its systems of thought and expressed through many avenues of teaching, reasoning, and persuasive communication. This is obscured when we read the history of rhetoric merely as a series of technical developments in a discipline that seems remote from the ordinary literary and persuasive practices of any period. But rhetoric continually poses questions about who is speaking, what is the argument and how is it revealed, who are the audiences, and what are their expectations.  

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necessarily raise emotional appeal to the surface as a theme that links rhetoric’s long history together, and that gives a key role to rhetoric’s second millennium, the Middle Ages, which otherwise can drop out of view. Whether we approach rhetoric as a system of production or as a framework of textual interpretation, we can turn its history inside out and rewrite it from its innermost and abiding core.